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CASE NOTES
Securities Regulation—Punitive Damages Under Section 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933—Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc. 1 —
Law Research Service, Inc. (L.R.S.) publicly offered 100,000 shares
of its common stock pursuant to Regulation A' of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The corporation, which had been in operation
since 1964, offered legal research assistance to the legal profession
through the use of computers. On June 5, 1963, L.R.S. and Sperry
Rand entered into an exclusive five-year contract whereby Sperry
Rand was to create and operate a system for the retrieval of legal
citations to be made available to lawyers.
The relationship between L.R.S. and Sperry Rand did not proceed
smoothly. On January 2, 1965, Sperry Rand terminated the contract,
alleging that L.R.S. had failed to pay approximately $82,000 which
it owed to and which had been demanded by Sperry Rand. In re-
sponse to the termination of the contract, L.R.S. commenced suit on
February 23, 1965, against Sperry Rand for breach of contract and
sought to compel specific performance. In the meantime, L.R.S. con-
tinued with its public offering. On March 15, 1965, it issued the re-
quired offering circular which, in reference to the Sperry Rand con-
tract, only stated that the corporation owed $82,000 to Sperry Rand.
Nowhere did the offering circular mention the fact that Sperry Rand
had terminated the contract and that L.R.S. had initiated legal proceed-
ings. The plaintiffs, thirteen purchasers of the L.R.S. common stock,
sued L.R.S., its president, and Blair & Co., its underwriter, alleging
that the relevant omission from the offering circular constituted com-
mon law fraud, violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 3
(1933 Act) and Section I0(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act). 4 The United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
1 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
2 17 C.F.R. § 231.256 (Supp. 1959).
3 Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. 77q (1964).
4 Section 10 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
. . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
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trict of New York found in favor of all the defendants on the common
law fraud claim, but it found for the plaintiffs with regard to the actions
based on both the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 5 The jury awarded compen-
satory damages amounting to $32,591.14 and punitive damages against
the president of L.R.S. in the amount of $26,812.06 and against Blair
& Co. in the amount of $13,000.00. Since the court found that there
was no common law fraud and because it was bound by a prior opinion
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals denying the award of punitive
damages under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,° the award of punitive
damages was based on the finding of a violation of Section 17(a) of
the 1933 Act! On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed as to punitive damages and HELD: Punitive
damages cannot be awarded on the basis of Section 17(a) of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933.°
In reaching its decision the court of appeals dealt directly with
the matters considered by the district court. The district court in-
structed the jury that it could award punitive damages if, after finding
that the defendants had violated section 17(a), it could find that the
defendant's conduct was so inimical to "the public interest . . . [as
to] involve a high moral culpability!' The district court stated the
policy that punitive damages were necessary to deter wilfully deceptive
conduct regarding transactions in securities." The court also saw a
need to provide financial incentive to injured parties whose actual
monetary losses were not sufficient to support the cost of a law suit."
Even though the district court was persuaded by these policy con-
siderations, it faced a series of legal hurdles before it could rule that
they be implemented. Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act specifies that
damages available under the Act be limited to "actual damages!"
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964).
5 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In the district court, the plaintiffs also sued
Blair & Co. for violation of § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77/(2)(1964), and
§ 15(1) of the 1934 Act, 5 U.S.C. § 78o-1 (1964). There was also a cross-claim by Blair
& Co. against L.R.S. because L.R.S. had agreed to indemnify Blair & Co. for any losses
sustained by the latter as a result of the offering. The district court dismissed the cross-
claim, holding that it would be against public policy to enter into such an agreement
where Blair & Co. acted with wanton indifference to the rights of others. Id. at 199.
8 Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968).
7 287 F. Supp. at 191.
418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969). The court also affirmed the district court's holding
on the indemnification issue. Id. at 1288. See note 5 supra.
9 287 F. Supp at 193.
79 Id. at 195.
11 Id.
12 Section 28(a) provides:
The rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in addition to any
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no
person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provision of this title
1032
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Furthermore, Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act," when read in the
light of Section 28(a), arguably evidence a congressional policy against
allowing punitive damages under either Act. The lower court overcame
the defendants' objections to punitive damages under section 17(a) by
finding that the section 28(a) limitation specifically provides that the
rights and remedies available thereunder are in addition to other rights
and remedies, and moreover that section 28(a)'s limitation to actual
damages applies only to damages available under the 1934 Act." Civil
remedies under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act fall within the category
of rights and remedies not available under the 1934 Act.
In overruling the district court, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals viewed the 1933 and 1934 Acts as a single comprehensive
scheme of regulation. While the court recognized that they were two
separate enactments, it concluded that the policies and interpretations
of the statutes should be as consistent as possible. It stated that since
the 1934 Act, which is the only basis upon which defrauded sellers of
securities can obtain relief," prohibits punitive damages," it would be
inconsistent to permit defrauded purchasers to be awarded punitive
damages under the 1933 Act." The appellate court also noted that
when the 1933 Act was promulgated, members of the Securities and
Exchange Commission assumed that civil liability would be limited by
the language of sections 11 and 12." Section 17(a), the court noted,
was basically a criminal and injunctive section." While federal courts
have allowed plaintiffs to maintain civil actions based on violations
of the criminal sections of the securities laws," the court of appeals
doubted that the 1933 Act was intended to apply to civil actions,
especially ones seeking punitive damages 2 1
shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total
amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964).
13 Section 11, which imposes civil liability for filing a false registration statement,
places the maximum recovery at the price at which the security was offered to the
public. Securities Act of 1933, § 11(g), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(g) (1964). Section 12, which
imposes civil liability for engaging in a prohibited offer or sale of a security, allows the
plaintiff "to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less
the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for
damages if he no longer owns the security." Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 771(2) (1964).
14 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964).
15 Id. § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 785 (1964).
n Id. § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964); cf. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291
(2d Cir. 1968).
17 418 F.2d at 1286.
n Id. at 1284.
15 Id.
20 See, e.g., Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.DN.Y. 1964); 'Mile v. Shields,
131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949)
(allowing civil suits under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act). See also Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (allowing a civil suit under § 10(b), the
criminal and injunctive section of the 1934 Act).
21 418 F.2d at 1284.
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The appellate court also disagreed with the lower court's deter-
mination that punitive damages are desirable for the efficient
enforcement and deterrent effect which the securities laws envision.
Violators of section 17(a) can be fined up to $5,000 and sentenced to
prison for up to five years.22 The Securities and Exchange Commission
may also suspend or expel violators or suspend trading in a stock. 23
The court of appeals felt that these deterrents, along with compensatory
damages, were sufficient to discourage violations of section 17(a)."
The court also observed that awarding punitive damages, especially
where there are thousands of people who might have suffered losses,
would cause an overwhelming burden which could financially ruin
defendants."
The court of appeals' basic argument was that buyers and sellers
of securities should be treated equally and, since sellers under Section
10 (b) of the 1934 Act could not recover punitive damages, then buyers
also should not be allowed punitive damages under Section 17(a) of
the 1933 Act. As authority for allowing recovery under section 10(b),
the court cited Green v. Wolf Corp.,2° and Meisel v. North Jersey
Trust Co?' In Green the plaintiff brought an action for compensatory
damages under section 10(b) alleging the use of untrue and misleading
statements in a registration statement. He also sought punitive
damages, but this latter claim was denied. The court stated that the
section 28(a) language, "no person . . . shall recover . .. a total
amount in excess of his actual damages,"28 is clear—only actual dam-
ages can be recovered under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934."
The court pointed out that punitive damages are not needed as a
deterrent," that the resulting possibility of cumulative harm would be
staggering,31 and that the 1934 Act also has criminal sanctions for
violation.32
In Meisel the same issue was in dispute—whether punitive dam-
ages could be awarded under section 10(b). As in Green, the court
dismissed this issue with little discussion, saying that section 28(a) of
the 1934 Act made it clear that punitive damages could not be
awarded."
The Second Circuit's interpretation of section 28(a) as excluding
punitive damages may be questioned. Section 28(a) states that rem-
edies available under the 1934 Exchange Act are in addition to all
22 Securities Act of 1933, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1964).
23 Id. § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1964).
24 151 4 8 F.2d at 1285.
2a 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968).
2 T 216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
28 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964).
29 406 F.2d at 303.
30 Id.
81 Id.
32 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1964).
33 216 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
1034
CASE NOTES
other existing rights and remedies." It also provides that "no person
permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this
title" shall recover more than actual damages." (Emphasis added.)
The right to sue for damages for a violation of section 10(b) however,
is based on the general tort theory that the violation of a criminal
statute provides a basis for civil liability. It is not one granted by the
statute; thus it is arguable that punitive damages should be allowed
under section 10(b).
The Globus court's denial of punitive damages under section 10(b)
is in conflict with the rule applied by courts in other circuits. In Hecht
v. Harris, Upham & Co.," the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California said that under certain circumstances punitive dam-
ages could be awarded in a suit brought under section 10(b). The
Hecht court looked to the special language of section 28(a) limiting
recovery to actual damages in causes of action "permitted" by the Act,
and pointed out that there were several sections of the Act which
specifically "permitted" civil causes of action." The court then con-
cluded that section 28 (a)'s limitation to actual damages applies only
to those causes of action which are specifically provided for by the 1934
Act. While the court in Hecht felt that punitive damages were not
necessary on the facts in that particular case, it did state, contrary
to the interpretation of the Second Circuit, that punitive damages
could have been recovered under section 10(b). The reasoning in Hecht
also was followed in deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co.,38 where the
District Court for the District of Colorado stated that an action for
damages under section 10(b) is not "permitted" by the Act, in the
sense of being created by it, but rather is grounded in the common law
of torts.
Assuming the correctness of the Second Circuit's ruling that sec-
tion 28(a) precludes the awarding of punitive damages in any civil
action based on the 1934 Act, it still must be shown that section 28(a)
applies also to the 1933 Act. The Globus court treated both Acts as
one, but failed to discuss the fact that applicability of Section 28(a)
of the 1934 Act is specifically limited to "the provisions of the title.""
The pivotal rationale for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' view
that section 28(a) applied to the 1933 Act was that the civil liability
sections of the Act specifically limit the amount that could be re-
covered." However, the suit in Globus was not based on these civil
84 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964); see note 12
supra.
• 	 35 Id.
36 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 196 8).
87 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 9(e), 16(b), 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e),
78p(b), 78r (1964).
88 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969 )•
89 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964); see text of
§ 28 at note 12 supra.
40 Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11g, 12(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(g), 771(2) (1964).
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liability sections. Furthermore, the lack of any all encompassing pro-
vision in the 1933 Act similar to that of section 28(a) would seem to
imply that punitive damages are not precluded from all sections of the
1933 Act.
The Second Circuit, prior to the Globus decision, had not raised
any policy barriers to punitive damages when the actionable wrong in-
volved securities. Actually, in dicta the court has spoken to the con-
trary. In the Green case the court noted that "punitive damages are
permitted under the Securities Act of 1933 Similarly, in Gann
v. Bernz-Omatic Corp.,' a case based on section 10(b), the defendant
seller moved to strike the plaintiff's plea for punitive damages on the
ground that section 28(a) prohibited such recovery. The District
Court for the Southern District of New York said, however, that aside
from the federal claim, the plaintiff's complaint stated a claim under
state law for fraud and deceit over which the federal court had pen-
dent jurisdiction." The court held that if the plaintiffs established their
state claim, they could receive punitive damages if certain standards
of willfullness were met." Thus, the Gann holding and the Green dicta
illustrate that, prior to Globus, punitive damages for securities viola-
tions were recognized by the second circuit. It is submitted that the
policy of Gann allowing punitive damages for securities violations
should be followed in a civil action based on Section 17(a) of the 1933
Act.
Persuasive arguments have been marshalled contending that it is
improper to allow any kind of civil remedy on the basis of section
17(a)." Since Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act provide remedies for
civil liabilities, it has been suggested that these are the only civil
remedies which should be available. Commissioner Landis of the
Federal Trade Commission, who helped draft the 1933 Act, stated:
The suggestion has been made on occasion that civil
liabilities arise from a violation of Section 17, the first subsec-
tion of which makes unlawful the circulation of falsehoods
and untruths in connection with the sale of a security in inter-
state commerce or through the mails. But a reading of this
section in the light of the entire Act leaves no doubt but that
violations of its provisions give rise only to a liability to be
restrained by injunctive action or, if willfully done, to a lia-
bility to be punished criminally."
Most courts, however, including the Globus court, have held that
section 17(a) provides the basis for a civil remedy. This holding is
based upon the generally accepted asumption that a criminal statute
41 406 F.2d at 303.
42 262 F. Supp. 301 (SD.N.Y. 1966).
43 Id. at 304.
44 Id. at 302, 304.
45 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1785-88 (2d ed. 1961).
48 Landis, Liability Sections of Securities Act, 18 Am. Accountant 330, 331 (1933).
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establishes a standard of conduct, deviation from which constitutes
negligence!' Because such statutes legislatively alter the existing
standards of conduct, they should be interpreted as recognizing civil,
as well as criminal liability. The court's willingness to accept civil
suits based on section 17(a) is illustrated in Dack v. Shanman." In
this case, the plaintiffs sued under Sections 12 and 17(a) of the 1933
Act. The District Court for the Southern District of New York dis-
missed the claim based on section 12 because the one-year statute of
limitations had run, but it did not dismiss the almost identical claim
based on section 17(a) because, it held, this common law action was
governed by the New York six-year statute of limitations."
If civil remedies based on deviations from the standards of con-
duct prescribed by section 17(a) are available, it must be determined
whether punitive as well as actual damages should be awarded there-
under. Since, as discussed above, the section is ambiguous to the extent
that different courts have interpreted it as both allowing and disallow-
ing punitive damages, it would seem that the proper determination
should turn upon what policies section 17(a) seeks to effect, and
whether the use of punitive damages can be helpful in implementing
those policies.
The use of punitive damages in addition to penal sanctions and
actual damages has been severely criticized 6 0 It has been said that
where there is a multiplicity of plaintiffs bringing suits, the defendant
would be forced to pay an unconscionable amount in the form of
punitive damages 6 1 But this argUment fails to take into account that
most courts allow evidence of the defendant's financial position in order
to ascertain a fair measure of punitive damages. 52 In line with this
policy, courts should, and probably would, initially charge the jury to
make the following findings of fact: (1) whether there was any viola-
tion of Section 17(a) of the Act, (2) if so, the extent of the actual
damages suffered by the plaintiffs, and (3) whether the violation of
section 17(a) was willful. If the jury finds a willful violation, it would
then have to determine whether to award punitive damages and, if so,
in what amount. However, prior to being sent back with this question
the defendant would be afforded the opportunity to present evidence
as to any prior punitive damages awarded against him and his general
financial situation. This information would allow juries to reach ratio-
nal and fair judgments as to punitive damages.
The use of punitive damages under section 17(a) also has been
criticized as tending to encourage a multiplicity of suits, with each
plaintiff striving to commence his suit first so as to receive an award
4T W. Prosser, Law of Torts 191-93 (3d ed. 1964).
48 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
49 Id. at 30.
59 Note, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 951 (1969); Note 54 Va. L. Rev. 1560 (1969).
61 Note, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 951, 957 (1969).
62 W. Prosser, supra note 47 at 14.
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of punitive damages before the defendant's resources are depleted."
This encouragement to bring suit, however, is not an entirely undesir-
able goal because many violations causing small, individual financial
losses to numerous plaintiffs might otherwise not be worth the ex-
pense of court proceedings to a single plaintiff. Moreover, if the primary
purposes of punitive damages are to punish and to deter the wrong-
doer, the fact that the first few plaintiffs might recover punitive dam-
ages while the others may not would not affect the accomplishment of
that purpose. The additional compensation given to the initial plaintiff
is merely a windfall." The plaintiff's claim for punitive damages should
be based upon the fact that potential wrongdoers should be deterred,
and that the defendant's conduct warrants punishment rather than
that the plaintiff is entitled to additional compensation.
It should be kept in mind that punitive damages would not be
awarded merely on the finding that material information was omitted
or misstated in a registration statement or prospectus. Juries would be
instructed, after hearing evidence about the defendant's financial
position and prior punitive damages, to award punitive damages only
if the defendant's conduct was wilful and wanton, or, as the district
court said in Globus, indicated "a high moral culpability."" This would
be a stricter test than the "willfullness test" 5° of the 1933 Act on which
simple actual damages may be based. Thus, the award of punitive
damages for securities violations, if limited as suggested above, would
increase the protection available to the buying public.
MARK P. HARMON
Products Liability—Statute of Limitations—Application of the Con-
tract Statute of Limitations to a Cause of Action for Strict Liability
in Tort—Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.'— In October, 1958
defendant Pittsburg Plate Glass Company installed a glass door at
the front entrance to the Rochester, New York building of the Central
Trust Company. The Plaintiff, Cecile Mendel, alleged that on October
29, 1965, while walking through the door, it struck her causing her
to fall and suffer personal injuries. In 1967 the plaintiff and her
husband initiated an action against the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Com-
pany in which they alleged that a fault in the door caused the in-
juries.' Recovery was sought both on the theories of tort and contract.
53 Note, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 951, 957 (1969).
54 Comment, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517, 525
(1957).
55 287 F. Supp. at 193.
56 Securities Act of 1933, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77yyy (1964).
1 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
2 The plaintiff and her husband also initiated an action against the owners of the
building, the Central Trust Company.
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